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The relationship between human rights and environmental rights is increasingly recognised 
in international and comparative law. This article explores that connection by examining 
the international environmental rights regime and the approaches taken at a domestic level 
in various countries to constitutionalising environmental protection. It compares these ap-
proaches to that in Australia. It finds that Australian law compares poorly to elsewhere. No 
express constitutional provision imposing obligations on government to protect the envi-
ronment or empowering litigants to compel state action exists, and the potential for draw-
ing further constitutional implications appears distant. As the climate emergency escalates, 
renewed focus on the link between environmental harm and human harm is required, and 
law and policymakers in Australia are encouraged to build on existing law in developing 
broader environmental rights protection. 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N  
In 1983, the High Court of Australia held that Commonwealth legislation pre-
venting the proposed construction of a hydro-electric dam on the World Her-
itage listed Gordon River in Tasmania was valid.1 Recognised now as ‘one of the 
most significant conservation victories in Australian history’,2  
Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘Tasmanian Dam Case ’) put an end to the politi-
cally contentious project and marked the resolution of several years of heated 
debate in the State and across the country.3 The case also illustrated Australia’s 
indirect approach to environmental rights protection. Undoubtedly significant 
to the burgeoning environmental movement in Australia,4 the decision did not 
rest on environmental grounds at all. As the Court made clear in an ‘unusual’ 
statement preceding the judgment,5 the Court was ‘in no way concerned with 
the question whether it is desirable or undesirable, either on the whole or from 
any particular point of view, that the construction of the dam should proceed’.6 
Rather, the ‘strictly legal questions’7 before the Court were focused entirely on 
the scope of Commonwealth power. Once that issue had been resolved, the in-
exorable mechanical force of s 109 of the Constitution ensured that Common-
wealth legislation would prevail over its Tasmanian equivalent to the extent of 
any inconsistency. 
Environmental protection was not central to the resolution of the Tasma-
nian Dam Case because environmental protection is not a subject of federal 
legislative power and no right to a healthy environment is enshrined in the Con-
stitution.8 Australia increasingly stands apart in this regard. According to the 
 
 1 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case ’). 
 2 Andrew Macintosh, ‘The Tasmanian Dam Case and the “Green Commonwealth” Hypothesis’ 
in Michael Coper, Heather Roberts and James Stellios (eds), The Tasmanian Dam Case 30 Years 
On: An Enduring Legacy (Federation Press, 2017) 149, 149. See also Jack Waterford, ‘No Dam 
in the Wilderness: Emotions Running Hot near Dam Site’, The Canberra Times (Canberra, 2 
July 1983) 1. 
 3 See Gareth Evans, ‘The Background Politics of the Tasmanian Dam Case’ in Michael Coper, 
Heather Roberts and James Stellios (eds), The Tasmanian Dam Case 30 Years On: An Enduring 
Legacy (Federation Press, 2017) 11. 
 4 See, eg, Paddy Manning, Inside the Greens: The Origins and Future of the Party, the People and 
the Politics (Black Inc, 2019) ch 2. 
 5 Michael Coper, Heather Roberts and James Stellios, ‘Introduction’ in Michael Coper, Heather 
Roberts and James Stellios (eds), The Tasmanian Dam Case 30 Years On: An Enduring Legacy 
(Federation Press, 2017) 1, 5. 
 6 Tasmanian Dam Case (n 1) 58. 
 7 Ibid. 
 8 George Williams, ‘Human Rights and the Tasmanian Dam Case’ in Michael Coper, Heather 
Roberts and James Stellios (eds), The Tasmanian Dam Case 30 Years On: An Enduring Legacy 
(Federation Press, 2017) 129, 130–1. 
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Comparative Constitutions Project, 159 national constitutions around the 
globe include provisions relating to the protection of the environment, either 
in their preamble or operative articles.9 
Constitutional protection of environmental rights is predicated on the un-
derstanding that environmental harm ‘can and does adversely affect the enjoy-
ment of a broad range of human rights’.10 This position is not novel. The inter-
dependent relationship between environmental protection and human rights 
has been recognised in international law since at least 1972, when the ‘water-
shed’11 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(‘Stockholm Declaration ’) declared that a healthy environment is essential to 
‘the enjoyment of basic human rights … [and] the right to life itself ’.12 
Almost 50 years after the Stockholm Declaration, the symbiotic relationship 
between environmental protection and human rights is of increasing concern. 
In 2016, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘Paris 
Agreement ’), dealing with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, adaptation, 
and finance, called upon states ‘when taking action to address climate change, 
[to] respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human 
rights’.13 Yet environmental harm continues apace. Three recent reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (‘IPCC’) describe the predicted 
trajectory of the environmental catastrophe that the world will confront over 
 
 9 Comparative Constitutions Project, Constitute (Web Page, 5 March 2020) archived at 
<https://perma.cc/9AMN-5C8P>. 
 10 John H Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relat-
ing to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/43 (24 December 2012) 12 [34] (‘Report of the Independent Expert’). See also Hu-
man Rights Council, Human Rights and the Environment, HRC Res 16/11, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/16/11 (12 April 2011, adopted 24 March 2011) 2. 
 11 Sumudu Atapattu, ‘International Environmental Law and Soft Law: A New Direction or a Con-
tradiction?’ in Cecilia M Bailliet (ed), Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: From 
the Margins (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 200, 208. 
 12 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973, adopted 16 June 1972) 3 [1] (‘Stockholm Declaration ’). See also 
Meg Good, ‘Implementing the Human Right to Water in Australia’ (2011) 30(2) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 107, 117–18. 
 13 Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, open for 
signature 22 April 2016, [2016] ATS 24 (entered into force on 4 November 2016) Preamble 
para 12 (‘Paris Agreement’). See also Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, ‘Transnational Climate 
Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South’ (2019) 113(4) American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 679, 722; Sumudu Atapattu, ‘The Right to a Healthy Environment and Climate 
Change: Mismatch or Harmony?’ in John H Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds), The Human Right 
to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 252. 
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the next century.14 Under the various scenarios considered by the IPCC, includ-
ing those in which emissions are significantly reduced, by 2050 low-lying meg-
acities and small islands are projected to experience extreme high sea level 
events annually.15 Historically, these events occurred only once a century.16 
Such disasters will create large groups of displaced people, destroy infrastruc-
ture, and weaken food supply, directly compromising the most basic of human 
rights of those affected, including the right to self-determination, the right to 
life, the right to food and water, the right to housing and shelter, and the right 
to security.17 The IPCC’s Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a 
Changing Climate also highlights the destructive impact that the warming of 
the oceans will have on ecosystems: threatening food security, income and live-
lihoods.18 Scientists predict, for instance, ‘that if current fishing practices con-
tinue, all commercially targeted fish species will suffer population  
collapses by 2048’.19 
Destruction of the natural environment will have a particularly devastating 
effect on Indigenous communities who rely on natural resources for subsistence 
and cultural identity.20 The IPCC’s Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere 
in a Changing Climate concluded that the detrimental impacts of marine warm-
ing will cause ‘potentially rapid and irreversible loss of culture and local 
knowledge and Indigenous knowledge, and negative impacts on traditional di-
ets and food security, aesthetic aspects, and marine recreational activities’.21 
Ocean ecosystem loss will undermine the ‘ocean’s role in cultural, recreational, 
 
 14 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Global Warming 
of 1.5°C (Report, 2018); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policy-
makers’ in Climate Change and Land: An IPCC Special Report on Climate Change, Desertifica-
tion, Land Degredation, Sustainable Land Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse Gas 
Fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems (Report, 2019); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Cli-
mate (Report, 2019) (‘IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere ’). 
 15 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere (n 14) 20, 28. 
 16 Ibid. 
 17 International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Dis-
ruption (International Bar Association, 2014) 43. See also Jane McAdam, Climate Change, 
Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 18 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere (n 14) 26. 
 19 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights, and the Environment (UBC Press, 2012) 11 (‘Environmental Rights Revolution ’). 
 20 United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report (Re-
port, January 2019) 12 (‘Environmental Rule of Law ’). See generally Randall S Abate and Eliz-
abeth Ann Kronk (eds), Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: The Search for Legal Remedies 
(Edward Elgar, 2013). 
 21 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere (n 14) 26. 
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and intrinsic values important for human identity and well-being’.22 Climate 
change is already affecting Indigenous communities far away from the ocean. 
Extreme heat and inadequate water security in Australia’s centre may displace 
many Indigenous peoples from their country.23 
A healthy environment is ‘necessary for the full enjoyment of a vast range of 
human rights’,24 but environmental harm has become so pernicious and so per-
vasive that it is now an existential threat to human life.25 This article explores 
the relationship between human rights, constitutional rights and environmen-
tal rights with the aim of understanding the scope and standard of environmen-
tal rights protection at international, comparative and domestic law. Such an 
understanding may prompt renewed focus on the link between environmental 
harm and human harm, and encourage law and policymakers in Australia to 
build on existing law in developing broader environmental rights protection. 
The article is divided into several substantive parts. Part II outlines the in-
ternational environmental rights regime and the various approaches taken at 
the domestic level to constitutionalise environmental protection. As this Part 
demonstrates, environmental rights may be a recent phenomenon, but they 
have gathered significant momentum over the last few decades.26 Indeed, de-
spite limited express mention in the early global human rights treaties, a mul-
titude of instruments negotiated after the 1970s form the basis for considerable 
international protection. At the domestic level, many states have followed this 
lead. States have adopted a wide variety of approaches to constitutionalising 
environmental protection, ranging from express or implied constitutional 
rights to constitutionally mandated directive principles. Whether such protec-
tion is effective is another question. 
 
 22 Ibid. 
 23 See, eg, Lorena Allam and Nick Evershed, ‘Too Hot for Humans? First Nations People Fear 
Becoming Australia’s First Climate Refugees’, The Guardian (online, 18 December 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/dec/18/too-hot-for-humans-first-na-
tions-people-fear-becoming-australias-first-climate-refugees>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/W8WM-TB6D>. 
 24 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obliga-
tions Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc 
A/HRC/37/59 (24 January 2018) 1 [2] (‘Report of the Special Rapporteur ’). See also, John H 
Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds), The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2018). 
 25 Human Rights Council, Climate Change and Poverty: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Ex-
treme Poverty and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/41/39 (17 July 2019) 2 [1]–[2]. See also 
Louis J Kotzé, ‘International Environmental Law and the Anthropocene’s Energy Dilemma’ 
(2019) 36(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 437, 444. 
 26 Roderic O’Gorman, ‘Environmental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study’ (2017) 6(3) 
Transnational Environmental Law 435, 436. 
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Part III turns to the situation in Australia. It explores whether and to what 
extent environmental rights are protected at the federal and state and territory 
levels. While a wealth of statutory and regulatory protection exists, the analysis 
in this Part is limited to a constitutional and human rights framework rather 
than the entire architecture of environmental protection. At this level, the po-
sition in Australia compares poorly to that elsewhere. This conclusion is 
demonstrated through a typology that assesses three different ways that envi-
ronmental rights might be constructed in Australia. They are:  
1 express or implied environmental rights drawn from international law; 
2 extension or inference from the text and structure of the Constitution; and  
3 extension or inference from existing human rights protected outside the 
Constitution.  
Although Part III finds that there is no express constitutional provision impos-
ing obligations on the government to protect the environment or empowering 
citizens and litigants to compel state action, and moreover, that the potential 
for drawing out constitutional implications appears increasingly remote, the ty-
pology demonstrates a model for conceptualising environmental rights in Aus-
tralia. In a brief Part IV, the future of constitutional environmental rights pro-
tection is considered. 
Before commencing it is necessary to address the framing of this article. 
Scholars have criticised approaches that conceive of environmental protection 
through the prism of human rights. As many commentators have noted, tradi-
tional human rights accounts have negatively affected environmental protec-
tion,27 and there is a risk that an anthropocentric approach will continue to 
posit the impact of environmental harm on humans, rather than the environ-
ment itself, as its focal point.28 The concern is that such an approach results in 
law and policymakers, not to mention industry, failing to recognise the value 
and importance of natural ecosystems beyond their use or benefit to humans; 
the environment is reduced to no more than an ‘inanimate machine existing to 
serve human needs’.29 
 
 27 Conor Gearty, ‘Do Human Rights Help or Hinder Environmental Protection?’ (2010) 1(1) 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 7, 7–9. 
 28 Made Adhitya Anggriawan Wisadha and Grita Anindarini Widyaningsih, ‘Human Rights and 
the Environmental Protection: The Naïveté in Environmental Culture’ (2018) 2(1) Udayana 
Journal of Law and Culture 73, 74. 
 29 Sam Adelman, ‘Epistemologies of Mastery’ in Anna Grear and Louis J Kotzé (eds), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015) 9, 11. 
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Framing environmental protection through the lens of human rights neces-
sarily shapes law and policymakers’ understanding of the environment and its 
relationship with and to humanity.30 It may lead to the prioritisation of certain 
goals (such as industry) over others (such as environmental protection). How-
ever, conceiving environmental harm in the language of human rights also car-
ries the potential to realise significant value. The rhetoric of human rights offers 
a pre-existing, accepted framework from which to pursue environmental goals. 
Human rights are recognised in many treaties, constitutions, and statutes, and 
have a number of international, regional, and domestic institutions and frame-
works in place to enforce them.31 A rights-based approach mandates a norma-
tive starting point for regulation and litigation.32 It focuses attention on consid-
erations of justice and fairness, including the impact of environmental harm on 
vulnerable populations. It may empower individuals and communities affected 
by environmental harm to leverage existing laws to pursue environmental 
goals.33 A rights-based approach to environmental protection is also arguably 
more able to leverage the inherent anthropocentrism of our legal system in a 
manner that results in tangible positive environmental outcomes. Put another 
way, environmental protection based on the established language of human 
rights is ‘more likely to be accepted in the current political climate’ than argu-
ments asserting rights possessed by nature in its own right.34 
It also does not preclude ecocentric approaches. In some states, legal protec-
tions that are directed to the impact of environmental harm on humans have 
been redirected towards the impact of environmental harm on nature itself. Bo-
livia has conferred legal rights and personhood to Mother Earth, who can be 
represented by humans in court.35 The Bolivian Constitution provides a right to 
a ‘healthy, protected, and balanced environment’, and allows any person to take 
 
 30 Marie-Catherine Petersmann, ‘Narcissus’ Reflection in the Lake: Untold Narratives in Envi-
ronmental Law beyond the Anthropocentric Frame’ (2018) 30(2) Journal of Environmental 
Law 235, 236. On framing, see Anna Grear and Julia Dehm, ‘Frames and Contestations: Envi-
ronment, Climate Change and the Construction of In/Justice’ (2020) 11(1) Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment 1. 
 31 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018) 7(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law 37, 40. 
 32 Peel and Lin (n 13) 722. 
 33 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23(3) European Journal 
of International Law 613, 625. 
 34 Good (n 12) 118–19. 
 35 Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra [Law of the Rights of Mother Earth] (Bolivia) Law No 71 of 
21 December 2010, arts 5–6. 
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legal action in defence of environmental rights.36 Similarly, the 2008 Ecuado-
rian Constitution refers to ‘Pacha Mama’ (the deified representation of nature), 
and confers upon it a ‘right to integral respect for its existence and for the 
maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolu-
tionary processes’.37 All communities and public authorities are obliged to pro-
tect this right.38 Similar approaches have been adopted in specific cases in Ao-
tearoa New Zealand39 and India.40 These examples illustrate the vitality and di-
versity of rights-based approaches. 
II   HU M A N  R I G H T S -BA S E D  EN V I R O N M E N TA L  PR O T E C T I O N S  
A  International Environmental Rights 
The three most significant international human rights instruments do not 
clearly enshrine a right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment. 
None of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR ’),41 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR ’),42 or the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR ’),43 expressly in-
clude or recognise the relationship between environmental harm and human 
rights. While this silence is not because the drafters considered the environ-
ment insignificant or were not conscious of the fact that environmental harm 
can affect human wellbeing, it is clear that they did not ‘foresee the enormity  
 
 36 Constitución Política del Estado [Political Constitution of the State] (Bolivia) 7 February 2009, 
arts 33–4 (‘Bolivian Constitution ’). Unless otherwise specified, all translations of constitutions 
referred to in this article are by the Comparative Constitutions Project (n 9). 
 37 Constitutión de la República del Ecuador [Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador] (Ecuador) 
2008, art 71 (‘Ecuadorian Constitution ’). 
 38 Ibid arts 11, 71. 
 39 Te Urewera Act 2014 (NZ) s 11. See also Jacinta Ruru, ‘Te Urewera Act 2014’ [2014] (October) 
Māori Law Review 16, 16; Carwyn Jones, New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand 
and Maori Law (UBC Press, 2016) 98. 
 40 Salim v State of Uttarakhand (High Court of Uttarakhand, India, Sharma J, 20 March 2017) 
[19]. Note, however, that this decision was overruled by the Supreme Court of India: Rita Brara, 
‘Courting Nature: Advances in Indian Jurisprudence’ [2017] (6) Rachel Carson Center Perspec-
tives 31, 35. See also Erin L O’Donnell and Julia Talbot-Jones, ‘Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: 
Lessons from Australia, New Zealand, and India’ (2018) 23(1) Ecology and Society 7, 11–12. 
 41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) (‘UDHR ’). 
 42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR ’). 
 43 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 19 De-
cember 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘ICESCR ’). States Parties com-
mit to improving ‘all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’: at art 12. 
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of … ecological degradation’.44 Perhaps many people did not; the global envi-
ronmental movement emerged in the 1960s, following the drafting of these 
principal instruments.45 
Reflecting this genealogy, substantive environmental rights are explicitly 
recognised in several regional international human rights treaties as well as a 
range of global instruments relating to specific groups of people negotiated after 
this date. For instance, art 14(2)(h) of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW ’) commits States Parties to 
ensure that women have the right to ‘enjoy adequate living conditions, particu-
larly in relation to … sanitation … and water supply’.46 Similarly, art 24(2)(c) of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘CRC ’) requires States Parties to con-
sider the ‘dangers and risks of environmental pollution’ in securing the right of 
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health.47 An 
explicit link between the environment and human health is also present in sev-
eral regional treaties. Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights provides that ‘[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development’.48 Further, art 11(1) of the 1988 
Protocol of San Salvador recognises ‘the right to live in a healthy environment 
and to have access to basic public services’.49 In art 11(2), the Protocol imposes 
obligations on States Parties to ‘promote the protection, preservation, and im-
provement of the environment’.50 Global protection is ‘modest’,51 but the com-
bination of these provisions may ‘indirectly suggest’ that some minimum 
standard of environmental protection is a foundational human right.52 
 
 44 Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Common Ground’ (1993) 18(1) 
Yale Journal of International Law 227, 227. 
 45 ‘Report of the Independent Expert’, UN Doc A/HRC/22/43 (n 10) 4 [7]–[9]. 
 46 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for sig-
nature 1 March 1980, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981) art 14(2)(h) 
(‘CEDAW ’). 
 47 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 2 September 1990) art 24(2)(c) (‘CRC ’). 
 48 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 
217 (entered into force 21 October 1986) art 24. 
 49 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Rights: Protocol of San Salvador, opened for signature 17 November 1988, 69 
OAS No A-52 (entered into force 16 November 1999) art 11(1) (‘Protocol of San Salvador ’). 
 50 Note, however, that because a right to a healthy environment is not mentioned in the Protocol 
of San Salvador (n 49) art 19(6), citizens are not able to bring a standalone case alleging a vio-
lation of this right. 
 51 Gearty (n 27) 19. 
 52 Boyd, Environmental Rights Revolution (n 19) 81. 
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The absence of express specific environmental rights protection at the global 
level has not inhibited treaty bodies from drawing out a range of substantive 
and procedural rights capable of protecting environmental interests as neces-
sary implications from the text of existing instruments. Indeed, as John Knox, 
the former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, has ex-
plained, international actors have ‘applied human rights law to environmental 
issues by “greening” existing human rights’,53 such that ‘[e]xplicit recognition of 
the human right to a healthy environment thus turned out to be unnecessary 
for the application of human rights norms to environmental issues’.54 For in-
stance, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘CESCR’) has explained that art 12 of the ICESCR, which guarantees the right 
to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, ‘is not confined 
to the right to health care’, but encompasses ‘a wide range of socio-economic 
factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life’, includ-
ing ‘a healthy environment’.55 Similarly, in General Comment No 36, the Human 
Rights Committee declared that ‘[e]nvironmental degradation, climate change 
and unsustainable development constitute some of the most pressing and seri-
ous threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to 
life’.56 In order to fulfil their obligation to respect and ensure the right to life, 
States Parties must therefore ‘preserve the environment and protect it against 
harm, pollution and climate change caused by public and  
private actors’.57 
Regional human rights courts have also uncovered implications that impose 
obligations on states to ensure some level of environmental protection. In 2005, 
for example, the European Court of Human Rights considered a claim that the 
operation of a steel plant in close proximity to the applicant’s home endangered 
her health and wellbeing, in contravention of art 8 of the European Convention 
 
 53 Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/37/59 (n 24) 4 [12]. 
 54 Ibid 4 [13]. See also Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human 
Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009) 7 [18] (‘Relationship between Climate Change 
and Human Rights ’). 
 55 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 14 (2000): The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) 2 [4], 5 [15] 
(‘General Comment No 14 ’). 
 56 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36: Article 6 (Right to Life), UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 September 2019) 13 [62] (‘General Comment No 36 ’). 
 57 Ibid. See also Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5(4) 
of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No 2728/2016, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (24 September 2020) 9–10 [9.4]–[9.5]. 
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on Human Rights (‘ECHR ’),58 which protects the right to private and family life. 
In Fadeyeva v Russia (‘Fadeyeva ’),59 the Court accepted that the levels of toxic 
elements in the air caused by the operation of the plant, which had considerably 
exceeded safe levels over a long period of time, either caused or increased the 
applicant’s vulnerability to illness. The Court found that although art 8 ‘is not 
violated every time … environmental deterioration occurs’,60 the adverse effects 
of the environmental pollution in this case ‘reached a level sufficient to bring it 
within the scope of Article 8’.61 The Court held that the State had a positive ob-
ligation to take steps to prevent interference with her rights and ordered the 
State to pay the applicant EUR6,000 in damages, in addition to her legal costs.62 
The lack of a clear textual basis for the protection of the environment can 
make it difficult for courts to intervene, however. Two years earlier in  
Kyrtatos v Greece (‘Kyrtatos’), the European Court of Human Rights considered 
a similar question.63 The applicants alleged that the illegal draining of a wetland 
to facilitate urban development adjacent to their property had destroyed the 
‘scenic beauty’ of the area and had caused considerable environmental pollution 
in violation of art 8 of the ECHR.64 Dismissing these submissions, the Court 
explained that while severe environmental pollution may affect a person’s pri-
vate and family life, it is necessary to demonstrate ‘the existence of a harmful 
effect on a person’s private or family sphere and not simply the general deteri-
oration of the environment’.65 This is because ‘[n]either Article 8 nor any of the 
other Articles of the Convention are specifically designed to provide general 
protection of the environment as such’.66 
The decision in Fadeyeva and the reasoning in Kyrtatos demonstrate the in-
terrelated nature of environmental harm and human rights. As these cases sug-
gest, there is an ‘undeniable relationship’67 between environmental protection 
 
 58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signa-
ture 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 8 (‘ECHR ’). 
 59 (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 55723/00, 30 November 
2005) (‘Fadeyeva ’). 
 60 Ibid 16 [68]. 
 61 Ibid 21 [88]. 
 62 Ibid 35–6. 
 63 [2003] VI Eur Court HR 257 (‘Kyrtatos’). 
 64 Ibid 268 [51]. 
 65 Ibid 268 [52]. 
 66 Ibid. 
 67 State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee 
of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) 
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and the realisation of human rights such as the right to ‘life, health, food, water 
and development’.68 However, the lack of express environmental rights in the 
ECHR means that the obligation on states is not to protect the environment per 
se, but to protect people from ‘significantly harmful environmental  
impacts’.69 
Over the last two decades, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
developed a more holistic approach to the relationship between human rights 
and environmental rights. In several cases in the mid-2000s, the Court noted 
that environmental protection is particularly critical for the realisation of In-
digenous peoples’ human rights as a consequence of their distinctive relation-
ship to land.70 In 2009, the Court broadened that understanding by recognising 
a more general ‘undeniable link between the protection of the environment and 
the enjoyment of other human rights’.71 In 2018, the Court went further. In an 
advisory opinion, the Court held that the right to a healthy environment is en-
compassed by art 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR ’),72 
which requires States Parties to progressively achieve the full realisation of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights.73 In reaching this finding, the Court empha-
sised that the right to a healthy environment ‘constitutes a universal value that 
is owed to both present and future generations’ and is ‘a fundamental right for 
the existence of humankind’.74 Significantly, the Court found that the right to a 
healthy environment is ‘an autonomous right’.75 As the Court explained, this 
means that 
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 70 See, eg, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) (Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 125, 17 June 2005) [137]; Sawhoyamaxa Indig-
enous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) (Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights, Series C No 146, 29 March 2006) [118]; Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C 
No 172, 28 November 2007) [121]–[122]. 
 71 Kawas-Fernández v Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs) (Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights, Series C No 196, 3 April 2009) [148]. 
 72 American Convention on Human Rights: ‘Pact of San José, Costa Rica’, opened for signature 22 
November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978) (‘ACHR ’). 
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the right to a healthy environment, unlike other rights, protects the components 
of the environment, such as forests, rivers and seas, as legal interests in them-
selves, even in the absence of the certainty or evidence of a risk to individuals. 
This means that it protects nature and the environment, not only because of the 
benefits they provide to humanity or the effects that their degradation may have 
on other human rights, such as health, life or personal integrity, but because of 
their importance to the other living organisms with which we share the planet 
that also merit protection in their own right.76 
In 2020, the Court first considered the scope of the right to a healthy environ-
ment in a contentious case. In Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat 
(Our Land) Association v Argentina, the Court confirmed that environmental 
harm can negatively affect other human rights and reiterated that certain 
groups in vulnerable situations may be particularly at risk.77 In this case, the 
Court held that Argentina’s failure to prevent and protect the Indigenous appli-
cants from years of illegal logging, introduced livestock and fencing, caused en-
vironmental degradation and violated their ‘interrelated rights to take part in 
cultural life in relation to cultural identity, and to a healthy environment, ade-
quate food, and water’ as protected under the ACHR.78 
International actors considering the interdependent nature of human rights 
and environmental protection have also identified a range of procedural envi-
ronmental rights drawn from the UDHR, ICCPR, and other instruments.79 Pro-
cedural rights are essential to the enforcement of substantive environmental 
rights. Such rights can ‘promote the transparency, participation, and accounta-
bility that form the cornerstones of environmental governance’,80 and may ‘fa-
cilitate the practice of ecological citizenship’.81 One key instrument is the 1992 
Rio Declaration. The Rio Declaration encompasses a range of key environmental 
principles, including the need for environmental impact assessments and 
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participatory rights, the precautionary principle, and the polluter pays princi-
ple.82 The 1998 Aarhus Convention is another valuable instrument, guarantee-
ing key procedural rights relevant to the environmental context, including right 
of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to 
justice to seek redress for environmental harm.83 These rights do not simply 
improve the quality and legitimacy of decision-making, but impose obligations 
on governments to consider environmental interests and undertake certain ac-
tions when planning or proposing activities that may impact  
the environment.84 
Soft law instruments like the Rio Declaration do not impose direct obliga-
tions on states.85 Similarly, the Aarhus Convention may only impose legal obli-
gations on its 47 contracting parties.86 Nonetheless, owing to the general ab-
sence of global, specific, textual environmental protection in legally binding 
treaties, these and other instruments have developed and articulated important 
environmental values and principles, making a ‘remarkable’ contribution to the 
growth of international environmental law.87 Soft law instruments can influence 
legislative and constitutional drafting, as well as judicial decisions at both inter-
national and domestic levels. The European Court of Human Rights, for in-
stance, has drawn on the Aarhus Convention and the Rio Declaration to hold 
that states must make available to those affected, information concerning envi-
ronmental risks.88 Similarly, in Zia v WAPDA (‘Zia ’),89 the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan considered a challenge to the construction of a high voltage grid sta-
tion in a residential area of Islamabad. Although the Pakistani Constitution does 
not contain express environmental rights, the Court considered that the Rio 
Declaration should ‘serve as a great binding force’,90 and applied the 
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ginia Environmental Law Journal 215, 236. 
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precautionary principle to stay construction of the grid station until research 
could identify the nature and extent of the environmental threat posed by radi-
ation that would be emitted by the power plants.91 As this decision suggests, 
environmental rights do not need to be explicitly enshrined in the text of a state 
constitution to be effective. 
B  Constitutional Environmental Rights 
The importance attached to the environment in the international sphere is re-
flected at the domestic level. In fact, protection is pervasive. While the precise 
number of states that constitutionally protect environmental rights is ‘some-
what difficult to determine’ because of uncertainties created by the ‘language, 
positioning, and framing of constitutional provisions’,92 almost 160 national 
constitutions across the world include substantive or procedural provisions re-
lating to the protection of the environment.93 This is an increase from 147 na-
tional constitutions less than 10 years ago.94 
Unsurprisingly, states have adopted many diverse approaches to constitu-
tionalising environmental rights. Professors James May and Erin Daly observe 
that some states enshrine a right to a particular standard of healthy environ-
ment, or impose duties on individuals or the state to protect the environment, 
while others recognise environmental protection as a matter of national or state 
policy.95 In some cases, states may recognise specific substantive rights such as 
sustainability, climate change, or the right to water, or they may entrench pro-
cedural rights in the environmental context.96 Of course, these approaches are 
not exclusive; some states ‘do all of these things, while others do none of them. 
Most fall somewhere in between’.’97 
Abstracting out from this discussion reveals that there are three primary ap-
proaches to constitutionalising environmental protection. First, some states in-
corporate explicit rights relating to environmental protection that may be jus-
ticiable or not. Second, other states may not specifically protect the 
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environment but municipal courts may have adopted similar interpretative ap-
proaches to that of the European Court of Human Rights in Fadeyeva,98 and 
uncovered an implied right to a healthy environment as necessary to fulfil cer-
tain specific human rights. The third, and in fact ‘most prevalent way of en-
trenching environmental constitutional obligations’, is via constitutional di-
rective principles that impose a duty on government.99 As Professor Tarunabh 
Khaitan has explained, constitutional directives are telic norms that impose a 
moral obligation on the political branches of the state to adopt measures to im-
mediately endeavour to reach the directed goal and to fully realise that goal at 
some later date.100 These principles are largely, though perhaps not entirely, 
non-justiciable. 
1 Express Constitutional Recognition 
Many states expressly recognise and protect environmental rights in their na-
tional constitution. Three factors generally account for such protection. First, 
environmental rights are typically contained in constitutions which have been 
drafted after 1970, correlating with an era when environmental issues became 
more globally recognised.101 Indeed, as Professors Dinah Shelton and Alexan-
dre Kiss note, ‘[a]lmost every constitution adopted or revised since 1970, either 
states the principle that an environment of a specified quality constitutes a hu-
man right or imposes environmental duties upon the state’.102 Second, states 
with constitutional environmental rights tend to include more comprehensive 
economic and social rights protections.103 Third, states are more likely to adopt 
constitutional environmental rights through acculturation or emulation, fol-
lowing states that share common historical, legal, cultural or  
geographic connections.104 
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Constitutional recognition occurs in different textual forms. The Ukrainian 
Constitution enshrines a right to an environment that is ‘safe for life and 
health’.105 Hungary,106 Turkey,107 Indonesia,108 and Nicaragua109 entrench a right 
to a ‘healthy’ environment, while South Africa specifies ‘an environment that is 
not harmful to … health or wellbeing’.110 South Korea uses the adjectival de-
scriptor of ‘pleasant’,111 and the Philippines guarantees a ‘balanced and healthful 
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature’.112 In Chile, the right 
is to an environment ‘free from contamination’.113 In the Dominican Republic, 
climate change is expressly considered. The Dominican Constitution notes that 
[t]he formulation and execution, through the law, of a plan of territorial ordering 
that assures the efficient and sustainable use of the natural resources of the Na-
tion, in accordance with the need of adaptation to climate change, is [a] priority 
of the State.114 
Some constitutions, including those of Kenya,115 Bolivia,116 South Sudan,117 and 
South Africa,118 explicitly extend substantive rights to future generations. In 
Bhutan and Kenya, the government is also obliged to maintain a specified per-
centage of tree cover across the country (60% in Bhutan and  
10% in Kenya).119 
Not all of these provisions are justiciable.120 As noted below, constitutionally 
recognised environmental protections may be addressed to the political 
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branches rather than the judiciary. Nonetheless, in some states, courts have 
drawn on express constitutional recognition in adjudicating environmental 
claims. In several states, for example, constitutionally enshrined environmental 
rights have been construed as including a duty to ensure that natural resources 
are responsibly managed. The sustainable use of resources is formulated as a 
duty of the state in the constitutions of Bolivia,121 the Dominican Republic,122 
Eritrea,123 and the Philippines.124 Section 16 of art II of the Philippine Constitu-
tion provides that: ‘The State shall protect and advance the right of the people 
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and  
harmony of nature.’125 
In the seminal case of Oposa v Factoran (‘Oposa ’), the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines applied art II to recognise the right of one generation (who were 
minors) to bring a class action on behalf of ‘generations yet unborn’ (invoking 
the principle of intergenerational equity) to ‘ensure the protection of that right 
[to a sound environment] for generations to come’.126 In granting the petition 
for a writ of certiorari, the Court described the right to a ‘balanced and health-
ful ecology’ afforded by art II as a ‘fundamental legal right’, and explained that: 
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns 
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation … the advancement of 
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter 
of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they 
are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.127 
Similarly, in 2004 Argentinian citizens sued their national and provincial gov-
ernment, the city of Buenos Aires, and 44 industrial facilities in relation to pol-
lution of the Matanza-Riachuelo River.128 In a series of decisions relying on  
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art 41 of the Argentinian Constitution, the Supreme Court of Argentina ordered 
the government to conduct an environmental assessment, establish a compre-
hensive restoration and remediation plan and inform the public about 
measures taken; they also ordered specific action, including scheduled inspec-
tions, the closure and clean-up of illegal dumps, and the improvement of sew-
erage treatment and stormwater discharge systems, with ongoing oversight by 
the Argentinian Federal Court of First Instance.129 
Courts in Kenya have also protected express constitutional environmental 
rights. From 2006, the Kenyan government entered into a series of agreements 
to purchase hydroelectricity from Ethiopia.130 Of concern was whether the de-
velopment of dams in Ethiopia would reduce water flow into Lake Turkana in 
Kenya, a lake that supports several Indigenous communities and is also a World 
Heritage site. The Friends of Lake Turkana Trust sued the Kenyan government 
seeking information about the purchase agreements. Drawing on the constitu-
tional right to a ‘clean and healthy environment’,131 the Court held that the gov-
ernment had an ‘obligation to the [communities] to ensure that the resources 
of Lake Turkana are sustainably managed[,] utilized and conserved’, as well as 
a duty to take precautions to prevent environmental harm.132 The Court or-
dered that the government disclose all information relevant to the agreements, 
and to take all steps necessary to ensure that they fulfilled the identified consti-
tutional obligation of responsible resource management.133 
Constitutional rights play a significant role in litigation seeking enforcement 
of climate change regulation. This can be particularly effective in seeking to en-
force international agreements, such as the Paris Agreement which provides no 
mechanism to review the adequacy of parties’ nationally determined contribu-
tions.134 It appears that human rights may be increasing in relevance in this re-
gard. Writing in 2019, Dr Annalisa Savaresi and Juan Auz drew attention to a 
‘tidal surge in climate change litigation’ drawing or based on human rights law, 
and identified 29 climate cases argued either solely on human rights grounds 
or on the basis of human rights and other grounds.135 
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One successful claim was recently determined in Colombia. In 2018, the 
Colombian Supreme Court of Justice ordered government action to address en-
vironmental degradation.136 In addition to recognising the right to life137 and 
dignity,138 the Colombian Constitution provides that every individual has the 
‘right to enjoy a healthy environment’.139 Twenty-five plaintiffs filed a complaint 
in the Court against the Colombian government, Colombian municipalities, 
and various corporations alleging that climate change, in combination with the 
government’s failure to ensure compliance with a target of net zero deforesta-
tion in the Colombian Amazon by 2020 (as agreed under the Paris Agreement 
and the Colombian National Development Plan 2014–18), threatened their 
fundamental rights and the rights of future generations.140 The Court upheld 
their complaint declaring that ‘[t]he increasing deterioration of the environ-
ment is a serious attack on current and future life and on other fundamental 
rights’.141 It ordered the federal government to formulate a plan to mitigate the 
rate of deforestation in the Amazon, to adopt measures aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, and to implement climate change adaptation strate-
gies at all levels of government.142 
2 Implied Constitutional Protection 
Human rights and environmental rights are interdependent and interrelated. 
Reflecting this relationship, treaty bodies and regional human rights courts at 
the international level have interpreted certain human rights to encompass or 
include specific environmental rights. This has also occurred at the domestic 
level. In states with constitutionally enshrined human rights but no express 
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environmental rights, superior courts have at times interpreted these rights to 
include environmental rights.143 
Environmental rights are often implied as necessary to fulfil the right to life. 
Writing in 2012, Associate Professor David Boyd notes that in at least 20 na-
tions ‘where the constitution did not include explicit environmental rights, su-
preme or constitutional courts have ruled that the right to life includes an im-
plicit right to a healthy environment’.144 India has perhaps gone the furthest. 
The Indian Constitution does not expressly provide for a right to a healthy en-
vironment but it does recognise several other human rights, including the right 
to life and liberty.145 Drawing on this protection, courts in India have ‘fostered 
an extensive and innovative jurisprudence on environmental rights’.146 This de-
velopment was first raised in the 1985 case of Rural Litigation and Entitlement 
Kendra Dehradun v State of Uttar Pradesh,147 where the Supreme Court consid-
ered a challenge to the operation of limestone quarries alleged to affect natural 
springs in the area. In noting the need to balance ‘environmental  
disturbance … against the need of lime stone quarrying for industrial purposes 
in the country’,148 the Court referenced the ‘right of the people to live in [a] 
healthy environment with minimal disturbance of ecological balance’.149 Several 
years later, in Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that the right to life encompasses the ‘right to [a] healthy environment free from 
hazardous pollutants’.150 This position was affirmed in Subhash Kumar v State 
of Bihar (‘Subhash Kumar ’).151 In Subhash Kumar, the Supreme Court heard a 
challenge against two iron and steel companies accused of discharging slurry 
waste into the Ganges River, degrading its quality and causing health risks. Alt-
hough the Court dismissed the challenge for lack of standing, it observed that 
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the ‘[r]ight to live is a fundamental right under Art 21 of the Constitution and 
it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoy-
ment of life’.152 
Courts in Nepal have also drawn on the right to life to uncover environmen-
tal rights. In 1995, proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court of Ne-
pal by a non-government organisation challenging the operation of a marble 
factory in the Godavari Forest on the basis that it had caused environmental 
degradation to the forest and the surrounding environment.153 Considering 
that ‘a clean and healthy environment is an essential element for our survival’, 
the Court held that the constitutional protection of the right to life ‘encom-
passes the right to a clean and healthy environment’.154 The Court therefore is-
sued a directive to the Parliament to pass legislation to protect the Godavari 
environment, including its air, water, and people.155 
Similar jurisprudence has emerged from Pakistan. In 2015, the Lahore High 
Court held that the government’s failure to address climate change infringed 
the petitioner’s rights to life, dignity, privacy, and property as guaranteed in the 
Pakistani Constitution.156 Drawing upon a broad understanding of the right to 
life as including the ‘right to a healthy and clean environment’,157 the Court de-
clared that climate change is a ‘defining challenge of our time’.158 The Court es-
tablished a Climate Change Commission to monitor and implement necessary 
changes to safeguard the fundamental rights of the State’s citizens.159 
Most recently, the Netherlands Supreme Court has found that environmen-
tal protection is intimately connected to the right to life. In State of the Nether-
lands v Urgenda Foundation,160 the Supreme Court considered an appeal by the 
Dutch government against a lower court ruling that had held the government 
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had not enacted appropriate measures to avert climate change. Dismissing the 
government’s submission that a legal obligation to meet a specific target would 
inhibit its flexibility to determine the most appropriate steps to reduce emis-
sions, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s ruling that the government 
must meet an emissions goal of 25% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020. The 
Supreme Court held that the right to life and the right to respect for private and 
family life guaranteed under arts 2 and 8 of the ECHR ‘entail the positive obli-
gation for the Dutch State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to pro-
tect the residents of the Netherlands from the serious risk of a dangerous cli-
mate change, that would threaten the lives and wellbeing of many people in the 
Netherlands’.161 
The right to life and the right to family life are not the only human rights in 
which courts have uncovered implied environmental rights. In 2007, the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance heard a challenge 
alleging that the government had failed to enact adequate measures to combat 
air pollution in violation of the constitutionally protected right to life and the 
right to health protected under art 12 of the ICESCR.162 Although the Court 
dismissed the claim on the basis that it is for the government rather than the 
judiciary to determine policy,163 the Court acknowledged that it is ‘arguable’ 
that art 12 ‘imposes some sort of duty on state authorities to combat air pollu-
tion’.164 Similarly, in Israel, the Supreme Court has established that the right to 
water is implicit within the right to dignity, which is guaranteed in the Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (Israel).165 
Not all courts have accepted these arguments. Federal courts in the United 
States since the 1970s have consistently rejected submissions that the United 
States Constitution implicitly encompasses environmental rights. In Tanner v 
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Armco Steel Corporation,166 for example, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas dismissed a claim that exposure to air pollution 
caused by petroleum refineries violated the right to life under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and the protections of the Ninth Amendment, which 
provides that ‘the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people’. The Court held 
that recognising the right to a healthy environment under the Ninth Amend-
ment would violate the separation of powers,167 and rejected claims under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as not applying to the actions of private in-
dividuals.168 Although this finding may suggest some scope for its operation in 
relation to public actors, the Court cautioned that constitutional litigation was 
‘ill-suited’ to dealing with environmental protections.169 Nonetheless, as Janelle 
Eurick has suggested, the right to a healthy environment has been uncovered 
in ‘constitutional provisions that guarantee citizens the right to life using similar 
or identical language to that of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution’.170 
More recent decisions have foreshadowed this development. In Stop H-3 As-
sociation v Dole, for instance, the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals recognised the relationship between environmental protection and the 
equal protection clause.171 The Court noted that: 
We agree that it is difficult to conceive of a more absolute and enduring concern 
than the preservation and, increasingly, the restoration of a decent and livable 
environment. Human life, itself a fundamental right, will vanish if we continue 
our heedless exploitation of this planet’s natural resources.172 
The Court avoided considering this question directly, but in 2016 the United 
States District Court of Oregon found a connection. In Juliana v United States, 
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment encompasses ‘the right to a climate 
system capable of sustaining human life’.173 Although that decision was subse-
quently overturned by the Ninth Circuit for lack of standing, the Court 
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recognised that the plaintiffs presented ‘compelling evidence’ that failure to act 
may ‘hasten an environmental apocalypse’.174 
3 Constitutional Directives 
The third approach that states may adopt to constitutionally recognise environ-
mental interests is through constitutional directives.175 Just like express or im-
plied constitutional rights, constitutional directives ‘place binding constitu-
tional obligations on the state’.176 Unlike constitutional rights, however, the ob-
ligations imposed by constitutional directives are addressed to the political 
branches of the state, rather than the judiciary. As Daly explains, they are de-
signed ‘to galvanize … legislative activity to protect the environment’.177 Alt-
hough many legal scholars focus on judicially enforceable rights provisions, 
constitutional directives are ‘[t]he most common form of constitutional provi-
sion related to environmental protection’.178 
Many states diverse in legal culture and constitutional history have adopted 
this approach. In some cases, constitutional directives are clearly obligatory. For 
example, the Gambian Constitution provides that the State ‘shall pursue a policy 
of … protecting the environment of the nation for posterity’.179 Similarly, the 
Swedish Instrument of Government Act outlines that ‘[t]he public institutions 
shall promote sustainable development leading to a good environment for pre-
sent and future generations’.180 In other cases, these directives appear non-ob-
ligatory. Dr Lael Weis identifies provisions that are declaratory in character, 
meaning that they designate certain values and policies as having fundamental 
status, but they do not create constitutional obligations with respect to those 
values or policies.181 Weis suggests that s 61(2) of the Timor Leste Constitution 
is an example of this form. That provision provides that ‘[t]he State shall recog-
nise the need to preserve … natural resources’. Another example is art 33 of the 
Qatari Constitution, which stipulates that ‘the State endeavours to protect the 
environment and its natural balance, to achieve comprehensive and sustainable 
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development for all generations’. While these ‘constitutional statements of 
value’182 record the significance citizens of East Timor and Qatar place on the 
environment, it is not clear what, if any, direct legal duties they impose on the 
State. Nonetheless, as Khaitan notes, even if broadly worded or not explicitly 
addressed to the state, these directives carry normative weight.183 
That normative weight is directed to the political organs of the State. Re-
flecting this, courts in the Netherlands and Greece have refused to recognise 
actionable substantive environmental rights from ‘constitutional provisions re-
quiring sound environmental policy’.184 In some cases, however, constitutional 
directives can assist in establishing environmental norms that can meaningfully 
influence the development of improved environmental policy and the creation 
of tangible enforceable rights.185 For instance, art 48A of the Indian Constitution 
provides that the State ‘shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment 
and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country’. This provision is a 
Directive Principle of State Policy. Article 37 of the Constitution states that such 
principles ‘shall not be enforceable by any court, but … are nevertheless funda-
mental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to 
apply these principles in making laws’.186 Notwithstanding this express prohibi-
tion on judicial enforcement, the Supreme Court of India has drawn on art 48A 
as an adjunct in clarifying the scope and content of the right to life.187 
The willingness of that Court to expand the scope of constitutional protec-
tion has not gone without criticism. Some commentators have argued that it 
has led to an institutional imbalance whereby the judiciary is relied upon to 
remedy the failure of the government to develop and implement policy,188 while 
others have criticised the Court for failing to provide ‘a coherent or principled 
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approach to directive principles’.189 Yet what is clear is that the constitutional 
directive has played a role in developing environmental protections in India. 
4 Efficacy of Constitutional Protections 
The preceding discussion illustrates both the prevalence of constitutional envi-
ronmental rights protection and its diversity in operation. It does not reveal 
whether constitutionalising environmental rights is effective or is more likely 
to lead to positive environmental outcomes. In fact, despite an increasing effort 
at empirically assessing this question, methodological difficulties remain.190 As 
Shelton acknowledges, while constitutional protection may have ‘halted some 
environmental deterioration in some countries … causality is difficult to 
demonstrate’.191 Those challenges affect the assessment of both justiciable rights 
and constitutional directives. May and Emeritus Professor Patrick Kelly note 
that ‘[w]hile many judicial opinions mention constitutionally embedded  
rights … surprisingly few have reached the merits and implemented constitu-
tionally enshrined environmental rights provisions’.192 Similarly, the United Na-
tions Environment Programme has found that although there has been an in-
crease in the quantity of environmental laws in the last five decades, ‘govern-
ment implementation and enforcement is irregular, incomplete,  
and ineffective’.193 
Constitutionalising environmental rights can lead to beneficial environ-
mental outcomes. Enshrining environmental rights in a state’s foundational in-
strument can have powerful normative and symbolic value. As scholars have 
suggested, framing environmental harm as a violation of fundamental consti-
tutional rights may augment and reinforce the social and legal legitimacy of 
these rights.194 This is important because environmental decision-making is 
‘paradigmatically’ polycentric in nature,195 and environmental interests may 
need to be balanced against other rights and interests. Constitutional protection 
may also act as a powerful incentive to develop sound environmental policy, 
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especially in relation to the enactment of legislation directed at  
protecting the environment. 
Empirical research supports these claims. A 2012 study found that 78 out of 
92 countries which provide for a constitutional right to live in a healthy envi-
ronment enacted domestic legislation to give effect to this right.196 That legisla-
tion appeared to be effective. Based on 2008 data, the study found that 116 
countries with constitutional protection had a materially smaller ecological 
footprint than 34 countries with no such rights.197 More targeted studies have 
found similar results. In a series of studies, Associate Professor Chris Jeffords 
and his co-authors have demonstrated several positive correlations between 
constitutional protection and environmental outcomes.198 Jeffords and Associ-
ate Professor Lanse Minkler have found that the presence of constitutional en-
vironmental rights led to better scores on the Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy’s Environmental Performance Index (‘EPI’).199 Associate Pro-
fessor Joshua Gellers and Jeffords have observed that states with constitution-
alised procedural rights are more likely than other states to facilitate environ-
mental justice by improving access to information and thereby allowing citizens 
to challenge environmental harm.200 They have also found that the combination 
of substantive and procedural constitutional protections is positively correlated 
with access to improved urban and rural water sources and sanitation facili-
ties.201 As Jeffords and Minkler caution, however, these positive trends ‘do not 
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support unqualified constitutionalization of environmental rights without  
careful deliberation’.202 
Indeed, there is general agreement that constitutional protection is not in 
and of itself sufficient.203 After all, states that have strong constitutional envi-
ronmental rights protection do not necessarily enjoy strong environmental pro-
tection. For instance, India was ranked 177 out of 180 countries on the 2018 
EPI, while Bangladesh and Nepal were ranked 179 and 176 respectively.204 Con-
versely, states such as the United Kingdom and Iceland, which have no consti-
tutionally entrenched environmental rights, have been recognised as having 
good environmental records (ranked 6 and 11 respectively in 2018).205 As this 
suggests, constitutional rights may be more effective when complemented by 
supportive architecture. Good policy, political will, adequate resourcing, and 
the development of sound institutional frameworks are also required.206 
Several considerations should be borne in mind, especially in relation to ju-
dicially enforceable constitutional environmental rights. First, proper drafting 
is important to maximise their beneficial operation. If the rights are ambiguous, 
their content uncertain or vague, or if they are not sufficiently adapted to local 
conditions, enforcement is likely to be more difficult. Because of their polycen-
tric nature, courts may be cautious in enforcing vague environmental rights, 
especially those that are constitutionally entrenched. Second, many constitu-
tions are silent on how environmental rights are enforceable. Even where citi-
zens can initiate claims to have environmental rights enforced, uncertainty may 
discourage vindication of such rights by litigation.207 Third, standing rules may 
also need to be relaxed. Without broad or open standing to enforce rights, con-
stitutional protection becomes arbitrary and discretionary. In countries with 
restrictive standing rules, access to justice is often limited to individuals who 
are personally and directly affected by the contravention of an environmental 
right. The problem, as some commentators have noted, is that the effects of 
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environmental harm on communities and populations are often indirect as a 
result of direct harm to the environment.208 
Fourth, even where liberal standing rules exist and enforcement mecha-
nisms are clear, actions may still not be commenced and court orders may be 
ignored. Relevant government departments are often under-resourced and 
lacking in accountability, particularly in developing countries.209 Without a cul-
ture of compliance and transparency, and the political will to prioritise and im-
plement environmental protections, even the most robust environmental rights 
may ultimately prove pyrrhic. Many constitutional environmental rights lie 
dormant by reason of political inertia and economic constraints. For example, 
the South African Constitution guarantees a right to a clean environment, and 
provides for open standing and access to the Constitutional Court of South Af-
rica,210 but that Court has yet to enforce that right.211 
Finally, environmental rights may not be enforced because the resources 
needed to do so are not available. The cost of vindicating environmental rights 
is often high. Extensive remediation by multiple entities (both public and pri-
vate) may be required. Court supervision of such remediation may be neces-
sary. In South Africa again, the Constitution enshrines a right to water and a 
requirement that the State ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of … these 
rights’.212 In Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa held that the measure of the State’s compliance with the requirement to 
achieve progressive realisation was to be assessed on the reasonableness of its 
efforts, and not its success.213 Perhaps it is for this reason that in 2014, the South 
African Human Rights Commission reported that 11% of households do not 
have any sanitation,214 despite that right being seemingly  
constitutionally protected. 
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III   EN V I R O N M E N TA L  R I G H T S  W I T H I N  T H E  AU S T R A L IA N  
CO N S T I T U T I O NA L  FR A M E WO R K  
A  Federal 
Constitutions across the globe recognise the importance of the environment. 
Australia is an outlier. The Constitution contains few express direct individual 
or general rights protections and no environmental rights are either explicitly 
or implicitly protected under the Constitution.215 The Commonwealth Parlia-
ment also has no express power to make laws with respect to environmental 
management or protection. At the time of the Constitutional Convention de-
bates, ‘the concept of environmental protection and conservation, and indeed 
environmental law as a separate discipline, was unknown’.216 In any event, Pro-
fessor James Crawford has noted that if the drafters had considered the envi-
ronment in any meaningful way, it is more likely that they would have ‘empha-
sised the immensity of the continent, [and] the difficulties in “overcoming” it, 
rather than the fragility of many of its ecosystems or the problems in managing 
it once it had been “overcome”’.217 
Notwithstanding the absence of express legislative power, the Common-
wealth Parliament enjoys ‘significant scope to make laws on environmental 
matters’.218 Subject to limitations inherent to each head of power, it can regulate 
environmental activity through a range of other powers.219 Most prominent is 
the external affairs power, which supported the legislation that prevented the 
damming of the Gordon River in Tasmania in the 1980s.220 Other important 
powers that have operated to promote environmental protection include the 
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corporations power, the taxation power, and the trade and commerce power.221 
These powers are valuable but any protection they offer is ancillary. They do not 
allow the Parliament to pass legislation to directly protect or promote environ-
mental interests without a sufficient connection to a constitutional head of 
power. Nor do they entitle an individual to seek a freestanding remedy for en-
vironmental harm. At best, they can provide a legislative power to protect en-
vironmental interests where those interests intersect with the subject matter of 
the head of power. 
1 Rights Drawn from International Law 
The absence of express environmental rights protection in the Constitution does 
not mean that a right to a healthy environment may not exist. Such a right could 
be drawn from international instruments that Australia has ratified. Although 
global human rights treaties largely do not expressly cover environmental pro-
tection, United Nations treaty bodies have drawn out implied environmental 
rights from the text of those instruments.222 As noted above, in General Com-
ment No 14, the CESCR explained that the individual right to the highest at-
tainable standard of physical and mental health encompasses an obligation on 
the state to promote the social determinants of health, including ‘a healthy en-
vironment’.223 The Human Rights Committee has similarly noted the interrela-
tionship between environmental protection and the right to life.224 
Australia is a party to the ICESCR and the ICCPR and is therefore required 
by international law to meet its obligations under both Covenants. While States 
Parties are only required to ‘take steps’ to achieve the ‘progressive realization’ of 
the relevant rights under the ICESCR, the CESCR has noted that states must 
‘move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal’.225 Conse-
quently, at international law, Australia must take steps to promote a healthy en-
vironment as part of its obligations to meet the right to health. Similarly, under 
art 2(1) of the ICCPR, Australia must ‘respect’ and ‘ensure’ all people within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction enjoy the protected rights.226 
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Two challenges exist. First, enforcement is difficult. Australia has not incor-
porated the ICESCR or the ICCPR into domestic law so the judiciary cannot 
consider the specific provisions of the Covenants.227 Further, while failure to 
meet obligations under the Covenants ordinarily leaves open the potential of 
international enforcement, Australia has not signed or ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR.228 As such, individuals who claim that their right to a 
healthy environment has been violated and who have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies are unable to submit a complaint to the CESCR. The situa-
tion is different for the ICCPR but enforcement difficulties remain. Australia 
has ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, enabling individuals to submit 
a written complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.229 Rely-
ing on this avenue, in 2019 a group of Torres Strait Islander people submitted a 
complaint alleging that Australia’s failure to take adequate steps to reduce car-
bon emissions or pursue adaptation measures on the low-lying islands has vio-
lated their rights to life, private and family life, and culture under arts 6, 17 and 
27 of the ICCPR, respectively.230 The claim is currently pending, but in August 
2020 reports indicated that Australia asked the Committee to dismiss the peti-
tion.231 Australia’s submission is telling. Even if the Human Rights Committee 
finds for the Torres Strait Islander petitioners, there is no legal requirement on 
Australia to accept its recommendations. Indeed, Remedy Australia, a non-gov-
ernmental organisation that tracks Australia’s compliance with UN decisions, 
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has calculated that Australian breaches identified by the [Human Rights Com-
mittee] have been met with an adequate remedy in only 13% of cases.232 
Second, it is not clear that the recommendations of United Nations treaty 
bodies would even be considered by the judiciary.233 In Maloney v The Queen, 
the High Court considered a challenge to s 168B of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), 
which restricted the possession of alcohol in an Indigenous community.234 
Maloney alleged that the law was racially discriminatory in breach of s 10 of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA ’). In response, Queensland con-
tended that if the law was racially discriminatory, it was a ‘special measure’ for 
the purposes of s 8 of the RDA and therefore valid. Maloney disagreed, arguing 
in part that it could not be a special measure because it was introduced without 
sufficient consultation of the Bwgcolman (Palm Island) community.235 The text 
of the RDA and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (‘CERD ’)236 do not expressly require consultation with 
an affected ethnic or racial community.237 However, pointing to recommenda-
tions of the CERD Committee, Maloney contended that ‘considerable develop-
ments in international jurisprudence and international standard-setting’ evi-
denced an evolved position at international law relevant for the construction of 
the RDA.238 
The Court rejected this claim and downplayed the relevance of extrinsic in-
ternational legal materials in interpreting Australia’s treaty obligations. Chief 
Justice French considered that the output of international courts or tribunals 
‘may illuminate the interpretation of [a treaty] provision’, but it ‘does not mean 
that Australian courts can adopt “interpretations” which rewrite the 
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incorporated text’.239 Justice Kiefel held similarly, noting that courts can rely on 
extraneous materials to aid interpretation only where they ‘can be accommo-
dated in the process of construing the domestic statute’ and have been agreed 
to by Australia.240 Other members of the Court were less accommodating. Jus-
tice Hayne held that only material that ‘existed at the time the RDA was enacted’ 
would be relevant,241 and Crennan J denied any role to such material. To do 
otherwise would ‘elevate non-binding extraneous materials over the language 
of the text of an international convention to which States Parties have agreed’.242 
As Bell J warned, the ordinary meaning of the statute ‘cannot be supplemented’ 
by additional non-binding criteria.243 While the Court adopted a more flexible 
approach to extrinsic international legal materials in a subsequent case,244 its 
reluctance to engage with the output of United Nations treaty bodies in Malo-
ney suggests that obligations drawn from international human rights treaties 
that do not expressly incorporate environmental protections may be difficult to 
sustain environmental rights in Australia. 
To avoid these complications, it may be simpler to focus on human rights 
treaties that expressly encompass environmental rights protection. As noted 
above, both the CEDAW and the CRC include specific provisions obligating 
States Parties — including Australia — to ensure that women and children en-
joy some level of environmental protection. Under art 2(1) of the CRC and 
art 3 of the CEDAW, Australia must respect, protect and fulfil the rights set 
forth in each Convention to all women and children in their jurisdiction. Both 
require that Australia refrain from taking any measures that would violate these 
rights, take action to ensure that these rights are not inhibited by third parties, 
and adopt appropriate measures, including legislative, judicial, administrative, 
and educative action in order to fulfil their legal obligations.245 Without incor-
porating the particular language of these Conventions into domestic law, 
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however, Australian courts may nonetheless continue to find it difficult to apply 
these rights. 
2 Rights Drawn from the Text and Structure of the Constitution 
Drawing directly from international law is difficult. It is possible that environ-
mental rights could be implied from the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion.246 While there are few positive express rights provided for in the docu-
ment, ‘[a]n astonishing feature’ of the High Court’s ‘jurisprudence has been the 
number of rights-related protections it has been able to weave from the yarn of 
the Constitution’.247 These include rights drawn from the constitutional system 
of representative and responsible government such as the freedom of political 
communication,248 and the right to universal adult suffrage (subject to limited 
exceptions),249 as well as certain due process rights drawn from the separation 
of judicial power.250 
Judicial consideration could expand our understanding of these principles 
by potentially grounding substantive or procedural environmental rights. Im-
plications drawn from representative and responsible government appear most 
fruitful in this regard. In several cases beginning in the early 1990s, the High 
Court found that the text and structure of the Constitution impliedly protects 
peoples’ freedom to communicate on political or governmental matters in or-
der that they may ‘exercise a free and informed choice as electors’.251 That free-
dom operates to invalidate legislation otherwise within a constitutional head of 
power that would impermissibly burden the freedom. It also operates to inval-
idate legislation that would ‘deny the electors and their representatives 
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information concerning the conduct of the executive branch of government 
throughout the life of a federal Parliament’.252 
Several cases on the implied freedom have concerned environmental pro-
tection, but environmental management or environmental rights have not 
formed the basis of any decision. Rather, environmental issues have proven 
suitable vehicles to explore the scope of the freedom. In Levy v Victoria, for 
instance, the High Court heard a challenge to regulations prohibiting access to 
duck hunting areas during the hunting season.253 The plaintiff argued that the 
regulations prevented him from entering the area to protest the practice of duck 
hunting and thereby ensure ‘that the people of Victoria could form informed 
political judgments about the position of the Victorian Government on the is-
sues’.254 The Court dismissed these arguments without exploring the merits of 
duck hunting or environmental protection more broadly. 
More recently in Brown v Tasmania (‘Brown ’),255 the High Court considered 
whether a Tasmanian law prohibiting persons from engaging in protest activi-
ties on and around forestry land and land on which forestry activities were be-
ing undertaken,256 impermissibly burdened the freedom. By 5:2, the Court held 
that the law was invalid. Each of the five justices that formed the majority in 
Brown recognised the link between environmental issues and political commu-
nication. As Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ acknowledged: ‘[P]ublic debate about 
environmental issues generally is relevant to both State and federal politics. 
Public debate about environmental issues in Tasmania has featured promi-
nently in previous federal campaigns’.257 
However, the consequences of forestry on ecosystems in Tasmania was not 
at issue. Central to the decision was whether the purpose of the law was com-
patible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of rep-
resentative and responsible government and whether it was reasonably appro-
priate and adapted to advance that objective.258 
Neither of these cases turned on environmental issues, but a range of proce-
dural and perhaps substantive environmental rights could fall within the pro-
tection of the implied freedom. The potential scope is, at this stage, narrow. The 
Court has been clear that the implied freedom is not an individual freestanding 
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right.259 It is a limited mechanism that prohibits legislation that interferes with 
the capacity of electors to make a free and informed choice. Nonetheless, we 
have seen that international and comparative courts have identified some envi-
ronmental rights as preconditions to the realisation of recognised human 
rights, such as the right to life. Could the High Court find that certain environ-
mental protections are ‘essential to sustain the system of representative govern-
ment prescribed by the Constitution’260 or ‘necessary to preserve and protect 
the system of representative and responsible government mandated by the Con-
stitution’?261 In other words, as Chris Bleby, the former Solicitor-General of 
South Australia has recently asked: ‘what does representative and responsible  
government require?’262 
Clearly, representative and responsible government requires some level of a 
healthy environment. It is arguable that, for example, electors cannot exercise a 
free and informed choice if catastrophic bushfires have destroyed election in-
frastructure. Could this be extended to find that approval of an industrial pro-
ject forecasted to contribute significant greenhouse gas emissions, or a mani-
festly inadequate climate policy and renewable energy legislative regime, would 
violate the implied freedom? The Dutch Supreme Court has essentially found 
this in relation to the right to life.263 However, while representative and respon-
sible government may well be conditioned on the existence of a healthy envi-
ronment, that connection is likely too remote for an Australian court at present. 
As the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights has 
explained, it is ‘virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal relation-
ships’ between specific actions (or inactions) and ‘a specific climate change-re-
lated effect’.264 It is also ‘often impossible’ to establish whether climate change is 
solely attributable to extreme weather events,265 such as bushfires. 
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It may be different for procedural environmental rights. Procedural envi-
ronmental rights are generally understood as comprising three sorts of rights: 
the right to information; the right to participate; and, the right to a judicial 
remedy.266 The first of these appears most promising. Accurate information 
concerning whether Australia is ‘meeting, [and] beating’ its commitments un-
der the Paris Agreement,267 the expected number of ongoing jobs arising out of 
mining projects,268 and the relative costs of climate action (and inaction),269 all 
concern political and governmental matters and are necessary for electors to 
make an informed choice. Consequently, laws that inhibit that access — poten-
tially including freedom of information laws that allow the government to avoid 
or unreasonably delay providing that access — could be found inconsistent with 
the implied freedom. This is especially significant in circumstances where the 
percentage of freedom of information requests refused by government agencies 
within environment-related portfolios has increased by nearly 50% over the 
past five years, delays beyond statutory deadlines are common, and costs 
charged are considerable.270  
Three complications exist. First, even though these procedural rights could 
promote environmental interests, their grounding is the capacity of electors to 
make an informed choice. Environmental protection is only indirect and to the 
extent necessary to protect the constitutional system of representative and re-
sponsible government. Second, any protection is likely to be restricted to nega-
tive rights; that is, a right affording protection from an exercise of governmental 
power rather than a personal right. Finally, they do not apply to private actors. 
In the example above, access to information on the forecasting of private sector 
jobs from a particular mining project would be limited to information that the 
government holds. It would not extend to requiring a private company to 
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disclose that information. Given these limitations, the scope for constitutional 
environmental protection in Australia at a Commonwealth level remains lim-
ited. 
B  States and Territories 
The situation may be different at the state and territory level. No state constitu-
tion or territory self-government Act contains environmental rights, but three 
jurisdictions have enacted a statutory charter of rights which could form the 
basis for such protection. While the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘ACT 
HRA ’), Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian 
Charter ’), and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘Queensland HRA ’), do not 
expressly protect the environment, creative judicial (and political) evolution 
could develop along these lines.271 
The ACT HRA, Queensland HRA and Victorian Charter protect a number 
of key rights. These include the right to life,272 the right to take part in public 
life,273 the right to peaceful assembly and association,274 and the protection of 
families and children.275 As noted in Part II, international human rights tribu-
nals and treaty bodies, as well as municipal courts in comparative states, have 
uncovered implied environmental rights as necessary to fulfil these obligations. 
It is not a stretch to consider that a similar evolutionary approach to statutory 
interpretation could be adopted in Victoria, Queensland or the Australian Cap-
ital Territory (‘ACT’). Other opportunities may also present themselves. All 
three statutes provide for the protection of cultural rights, which specifically 
refer to the right of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to maintain 
their spiritual, material and economic relationships with the land.276 An ap-
proval granted to an extractive industry where the operation of that industry 
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impinges upon an Indigenous person’s spiritual relationship with the subject 
land may be incompatible with that right.277 Each Act also protects a range of 
procedural rights necessary in the promotion and enforcement of substantive  
environmental rights.278 
Once again, complications exist. As part of the ‘new Commonwealth model 
of constitutionalism’,279 these Acts do not impose firm constitutional limits on 
legislative power. Rather, they invite political actors to engage in rights dis-
course by reviewing proposed laws for compatibility with human rights, justi-
fying any limitations, and overriding judicial decisions through ordinary law-
making processes.280 For this reason, these Acts afford little by way of substan-
tive enforceable stand-alone rights. Proposed legislation must be accompanied 
by a ‘statement of compatibility’ concerning whether or not the bill is compati-
ble with the human rights contained within the human rights legislation.281 
That statement must be considered prior to the bill being passed.282 Failure to 
comply with the requirement to provide a statement of compatibility has no 
consequence for the validity of the law.283 Moreover, under the Victorian Char-
ter and Queensland HRA there is provision for the Parliament to make an ‘over-
ride declaration’ in respect of legislation, so that it has effect despite any incom-
patibility with a statutory human right.284 Further, while in all three jurisdic-
tions the relevant Supreme Court may make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ 
to the effect that a provision cannot be interpreted in a way that is consistent 
with human rights,285 this declaration has no impact on the validity of the 
law.286 Where such a declaration is made, the Minister administering the rele-
vant Act (or the Attorney-General in the ACT) must prepare a written response 
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and table it before Parliament within six months.287 Only two declarations have 
ever been made: one under the ACT HRA and the other under the Victorian 
Charter.288 
Each Act also inhibits litigants’ ability to seek standalone remedies. All three 
statutes contain provisions with relevantly similar wording which imposes two 
obligations on public authorities. First, a public authority must not act incom-
patibly with human rights, and second, a public authority must not fail to give 
proper consideration to a relevant human right when making a decision or tak-
ing an action.289 In Victoria and Queensland, legal proceedings may be brought 
by a person affected, but only in circumstances where that person is able, inde-
pendent of the Acts, to seek relief (excluding damages) in respect of the im-
pugned decision or act of the public authority.290 Thus, the Victorian Charter 
and the Queensland HRA extend the available grounds of review in judicial re-
view proceedings to include unlawfulness arising by reason of a breach of  
s 38(1) of the Charter or s 58 of the Act, but this cannot be the sole basis of the 
claim.291 The ACT HRA is more expansive. It provides that if a public authority 
has acted in contravention of those obligations, a person who is, or would be, 
the victim of such contravention may bring legal proceedings, and are entitled 
to any relief that the court considers appropriate, except damages.292 Notwith-
standing this entitlement, there have been few cases, and fewer still successful 
cases, brought in reliance on the freestanding cause of action created  
by the Act.293 
These apparent limitations make sense given that the judiciary is not the 
major focus of each Act; they are directed to the political branch of government. 
Significantly, reviews of the ACT HRA and Victorian Charter suggest that they 
have had a meaningful impact in the policy arena, improving decision-making 
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and raising the awareness of human rights within government bodies.294 None-
theless, it is not clear to what extent policymakers are considering environmen-
tal rights as preconditions to the effective realisation of the rights protected in 
each Act. Given that environmental rights are increasingly being perceived as 
an aspect of basic human rights around the globe, the necessity to protect the 
environment should be considered by scrutiny committees, parliamentary 
drafters and public entities. 
IV  TH E  FU T U R E  O F  CO N S T I T U T I O NA L  EN V I R O N M E N TA L  R I G H T S  
I N  AU S T R A L IA  
In 2008, at a dinner marking the 25th anniversary of the Tasmanian Dam Case, 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke reflected on the relationship between environmen-
tal protection and human rights and issued this challenge to the audience: ‘The 
Gordon-below-Franklin … was, of course, a major issue. But, relatively speak-
ing, it pales into insignificance, against the massive challenge that we as a world 
are facing now. The very question of survivability is at stake’.295 
Internationally, although environmental law may be a ‘relatively new field’, 
it has experienced ‘a remarkable growth’.296 Today there are thousands of mul-
tilateral and bilateral environmental agreements addressing environmental 
problems,297 and environmental rights are increasingly conceived as a key foun-
dational precondition of human rights. This recognition is almost universal. 
Over 80% of the world’s states explicitly protect environmental rights in their 
constitution, either directly or indirectly.298 Although there are challenges in 
identifying causality, research has nevertheless demonstrated a material 
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connection between constitutionally enshrined environmental rights and im-
proved environmental outcomes at the domestic level.299 
Domestically, by contrast, the Australian legal landscape is rather barren 
and the response to the challenge laid down by Hawke has been somewhat 
mute. Neither the Commonwealth, state or territory constitutions, nor any self-
government Act, guarantees environmental rights. While parliaments enact 
legislation to protect environmental interests, there is often limited ability for 
individuals or communities affected by decisions to directly challenge govern-
ment action on that basis. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future. 
The potential for implied rights to be drawn from the text and structure of the 
Constitution appears remote, and the creation of new rights through constitu-
tional amendment is equally fraught.300 
In the absence of an ability to entrench constitutional environmental rights 
at the Commonwealth level, there may be scope for state and territory bills of 
rights to implicitly provide a measure, albeit qualified, of environmental pro-
tection. Limitations persist, however, and such protection is not judicially en-
forceable. Constitutional amendment at the state and territory level may assist, 
but such amendment is rare,301 and if not entrenched by manner and form pro-
visions, any protection can be amended or abolished by ordinary legislation.302 
Australian law is presently ill-suited to the times. As our climate emergency 
rapidly escalates, having an ever more direct and immediate deleterious impact 
on the very environment that we depend upon for the full enjoyment of our 
human rights, the necessity to afford meaningful and enduring protection to 
the environment becomes ever more pressing.303 As another politician ob-
served over three decades ago: 
What we are now doing to the world, by degrading the land surfaces, by polluting 
the waters and by adding greenhouse gases to the air at an unprecedented rate — 
all this is new in the experience of the earth. … [T]he evidence is there. The dam-
age is being done. … Whole areas of our planet could be subject to drought and 
starvation if the pattern of rains and monsoons were to change as a result of the 
 
 299 See above Part II(B)(4). 
 300 See generally Harry Hobbs and Andrew Trotter, ‘The Constitutional Conventions and Consti-
tutional Change: Making Sense of Multiple Intentions’ (2017) 38(1) Adelaide Law Review 49. 
There have only been 8 successful referendums out of 44 proposals: at 49. 
 301 Gerard Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 29. 
 302 McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 714 (Lord Birkenhead LC for the Court) (Privy Council). 
 303 Gearty (n 27) 21. See also Rebecca Nelson, ‘Breaking Backs and Boiling Frogs: Warnings from 
a Dialogue between Federal Water Law and Environmental Law’ (2019) 42(4) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 1179. 
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destruction of forests and the accumulation of greenhouse gases. … [T]he envi-
ronmental challenge which confronts the whole world demands an equivalent 
response from the whole world. Every country will be affected and no one can 
opt out.304 
The remarks made by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher are as apposite today 
as they were in 1989. 
 
 304 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to United Nations General Assembly’ (Speech, United Nations, 8 
November 1989). 
